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ABSTRACT 
 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued a concept release in 2011 
which proposes a mandatory audit firm rotation. However, PCAOB indicates that there is a 
limited amount of empirical data and research evidence on the potential costs and benefits of such 
mandatory audit firm rotation. This study provides some empirical evidences related to PCAOB’s 
concerns. Specifically, we find that the largest clients audited by Big 4 accounting firms have few 
material internal control weaknesses and accounting restatements. In addition, accounting 
restatements are often reported within four years after the beginning of accounting errors and are 
reported by the same auditor during the restatement period. These findings cast doubt on the 
benefit of mandatory audit firm rotation. We also find that the largest audit clients on average 
represent over 20% of the audit revenues of local offices of Big 4 accounting firms. Thus, 
mandatory audit firm rotations could significantly disrupt the normal operations of public 
accounting firms if audit clients are required to change auditors periodically. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
n July 30, 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was signed into law and introduced legislative changes 
to financial practice and corporate governance regulation. It introduced stringent new rules with the 
stated objective: "to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures 
made pursuant to the securities laws" (SEC 2003). Although there has been criticism of SOX concerning its 
compliance costs, there have also been benefits of the legislation. For example, SOX allowed businesses to 
standardize reporting systems and improve internal control efficiency. 
 
The SOX legislation also requires lead audit partners to rotate off an account after five consecutive fiscal 
years. This is considered as a compromise to mandatory audit firm rotation. Mandatory audit firm rotation is often 
considered as a stronger approach to improve auditor independence. Audit firm rotation represents a trade-off of two 
issues. On one hand, a new audit firm could provide more effective audits by allowing for a new pair of eyes 
auditing the financial statements. On the other hand, there would be a significant cost increase in time expended to 
get the new audit firm up to speed that the new client. A 2003 General Accounting Office report has the following 
overall conclusions on mandatory audit firm rotation: 
 
We believe that mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the most efficient way to enhance auditor independence 
and audit quality, considering the costs of changing the auditor of record and the loss of auditor knowledge that is 
not carried forward to the new auditor. We also believe that the potential benefits of mandatory audit firm rotation 
are harder to predict and quantify while we are fairly certain there will be additional costs. In that respect, 
mandatory audit firm rotation is not a panacea that totally removes pressures on the auditor in appropriately 
resolving financial reporting issues that may materially affect the public companies’ financial statements. 
 
However in 2011, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued a concept release 
proposing a mandatory audit firm rotation. This issue is also under discussion in Europe. The European commission 
O 
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currently has a proposal before the European Parliament that would require mandatory audit firm rotation. As of 
December 2011, the initial comment deadline, the PCAOB received over 600 comment letters in response to the 
concept release for mandatory audit firm rotation. Most of those comments were from auditors and most advised 
that the PCAOB take more time to study the issue and instead propose more modest reforms. In March 2012, the 
PCAOB re-opened the comment period for one month. On October 18, 2012, the PCAOB held their third public 
meeting on auditor independence and audit firm rotation. The PCAOB Chairman, James Doty, said that the issue 
would not be decided by the volume of comments but by data based analysis that many have provided. However, 
empirical data on potential effects of mandatory audit firm rotation is limited. 
 
The objective of this study is to provide some empirical data regarding specific questions raised in 
PCAOB’s concept release. For example, the PCAOB considers if mandatory audit firm rotation be required for 10 
years or more and if the requirement only be required for the very large firms. The PCAOB also consider if 
mandatory audit firm rotation provide a “fresh look” at financial statements that could reduce audit failure such as 
accounting restatements. Moreover, the PCAOB questions if mandatory audit firm rotation create disruptions to 
audit firms’ operations. Mandatory audit firm rotation is a complex issue involving a trade-off of many costs and 
benefits. It is not the objective of this study to provide a definitive answer to the merits of mandatory audit firm 
rotation. Instead, we provide a contribution to this debate by providing empirical evidence to some of the issues that 
the PCAOB is considering. 
 
Our empirical findings show that most of the large firms have high reporting quality with few accounting 
issues. We also find that most accounting restatements are reported by the same auditor during the restatement and 
restatement disclosure periods. The restatements are often reported just a few years from the beginning of the 
restatement period. However, we do find that the financial industry has a disproportion share of accounting 
restatements. An analysis of major client concentration among Big 4 show that client concentration is high in some 
geographical locations. This suggests that mandatory audit firm rotation could be very disruptive to audit firm 
operations. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of related literature and 
Section 3 presents our findings. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 4. 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
The need for audit firm rotation focuses on the question of auditor independence. Simply defined, auditor 
independence is a state of mind that allows the auditor to perform an audit without being affected by influences that 
can compromise professional judgment, allowing the auditor to act with integrity, exercise objectivity, and 
professional skepticism. The Principles of Professional conduct of the AICPA Professional Ethics code, Article IV 
requires objectivity and independence. Recently, the SEC has imposed restrictions on the on the kinds of non-audit 
services a firm may provide an audit client in an effort to enhance auditor independence. 
 
Although independence is clearly defined in the Principles of Professional conduct, audit failures have 
occurred due to lack of independence. In the case of ENRON, it was argued that a conflict of interest on the part of 
Arthur Andersen made it impossible for the auditors to recommend a course of action (from the consultants) and 
criticize that course of action (from the auditors). These types of problems led to the restrictions on non-audit 
services specified by SOX in 2002. Accounting firms cannot provide non-audit services such as internal auditing 
and information system design to auditing clients. 
 
There are many prior studies on the costs and benefits associated with auditor tenure with client. For 
example, Lim and Tan (2010) examine the relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality. The auditors define 
audit quality as the amount of discretionary accruals and find that audit quality is enhanced by extending auditor 
tenure since auditors develop stronger expertise in the clients’ businesses. However, the dependence on the audit 
fees of the clients negatively affects audit quality. The findings in Lim and Tan (2010) highlight the trade-off of 
costs and benefits of auditor tenure. But as suggested by the PCAOB’s concept release, there is very limited research 
on the costs and benefits of mandatory firm rotation since prior studies are based on samples with voluntary audit 
firm changes. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2014 Volume 30, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 229 The Clute Institute 
There are two recent studies that provide evidence related to mandatory changes in audit firms. Ruiz-
Barbadillo et al. (2009) examine the effect of mandatory audit firm rotation on the probability of auditors issuing 
going-concern opinions in Spain from 1985 to 1995 when mandatory audit firm rotation was required. The authors 
suggest that mandatory audit firm rotation could decrease economic incentive of auditors resulting in higher 
probability of going-concern opinion issuance. However, the findings do not suggest a significant relationship 
between mandatory audit firm rotation and probability of going-concern issuance. The authors conclude that their 
findings do not provide empirical evidence suggesting that mandatory audit firm rotation would reduce economic 
dependence of the audit firms on their clients. Tanyi et al. (2010) examine changes in audit report lag after 
involuntary audit firm changes for ex-Anderson clients in 2002. Audit lag is defined as the number of days between 
the fiscal year-end and the date of audit report. Tanyi et al. (2010) find significant increases in audit report lag in the 
year of the audit firm changes but the effect seems to be insignificant in the second year after the changes. Thus, 
mandatory audit firm rotation can cause decrease in the timeliness of company filings even though the effects could 
be temporary. Although Whalen and Cheffers (2012) do not provide direct evidence related to mandatory audit firm 
rotation, the authors examine the annual restatements occurred on or after January 1, 2006 by Russell 1000 
companies. They find that 64% of restatements were found while the predecessor auditor was still on the 
engagement and only 7.5% of restatements resulted from a new auditor performing the audit of the financial 
statements. These findings cast doubt on the argument that audit firm tenure would affect auditor independence 
negatively. 
 
3. SAMPLE AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
The sample firms in our analysis are the 100 firms with the largest market capitalization based in fiscal year 
2011. We extract our data using the audit fees file in Audit Analytics database. We focus on the largest 100 firms 
since PCAOB suggests that the initial consideration of mandatory audit firm rotation may be just for the very largest 
firms in the financial markets. The total market capitalization of our sample firms represents about 50% of the total 
capitalization of all firms in the Audit Analytics database. Therefore, these 100 largest firms are of significant 
economic importance in the financial markets. We use the fiscal year 2011 as our sampling period since financial 
data for 2011 are completely available by the end of 2012. Table 1 provides the sample distributions of these 100 
firms. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the firm size and fees paid to public accounting firms. The average market 
capitalization of these firms is $87.16 billion. The average audit and non-audit fees of these firms are $19.38 million 
and $6.29 million, respectively. Thus, the average audit fee is about 77.47% of total fees that these firms paid to 
their public accounting firms. Panel B show that PricewaterhouseCoopers has the most clients and Panel C shows 
that these 100 firms are from a large variety of industries. 
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics of Sample Firms (Sample size = 100 firms) 
Panel A:  Sample Firm Size and Fees 
 Mean (in 000’s) Median (in 000’s) 
Market capitalization $87,169,437 $57,030,392 
Revenues 58,817,472 37,393,000 
Earnings 5,775,174 3,269,000 
Audit fees 19,387 14,000 
Non-audit fees 6,295 3,382 
Total fees 25,682 18,641 
Audit fees as a percentage of total fees 77.47% 78.60% 
Panel B:  Sample Firm Distribution by Public Accounting Firms 
 Number of Firms  
PricewaterhouseCoopers 34  
Ernst & Young 26  
Deloitte & Touche 25  
KPMG 15  
Panel C:  Sample Firm Distribution by Industries 
 Number of Firms  
Mining 7  
Manufacturing 45  
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 14  
Retail Trade 10  
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 16  
Services 8  
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Table 2 provides the incidences of firms with reported material internal control weaknesses under Section 
404 of Sarbanes-Oxley. Panel A of Table 2 show that only five firms have reported material internal weaknesses 
since the fiscal years ending or after November 15, 2004, which is the initial Section 404 compliance data for 
accelerated filers. Except for American International Group and Mosaic, the other firms only had one material 
internal control weakness each. Chan, Farrell, and Lee (2008) shows that there is a significant relationship between 
material internal control weakness and earnings management. The findings of just a few material internal control 
weaknesses among the sample firms suggest that these firms have good reporting quality. Chan, Lee, and Seow 
(2008) reports that some management and auditors failed to identify material internal control weaknesses in their 
initial Section 404 reports. As a result, these management and auditors had to restate their Section 404 opinions in 
the subsequent periods. Panel B of Table 2 shows that there are only four cases of restatement of Section 404 
opinion among the sample firms. Consistent with the findings in Chan, Lee, and Seow (2008), these firms only had 
relatively minor internal control problems since the discovered number of material internal control weakness is one 
in all four cases. Overall, the findings in Panel A suggest that there were very few reporting problems among large 
firms as indicated by the small number of material internal weaknesses. Thus, the benefits of requiring large firms to 
have mandatory audit firm rotation could be limited. 
 
Table 2:  Firms with Section 404 Material Internal Control Weaknesses 
Panel A:  Original Section 404 Ineffective Internal Control Opinion  
Company Year Ended Date 
# of Material Internal  
Control Weaknesses 
 
American International Group 12/31/2004 5  
American International Group 12/31/2005 3  
American International Group 12/31/2006 1  
American International Group 12/31/2007 1  
General Electric 12/31/2006 1  
Monsanto 8/31/2011 1  
Mosaic 5/31/2006 3  
Mosaic 5/31/2007 1  
General Motors 12/31/2009 1  
Panel B:  Restated Section 404 Ineffective Internal Control Opinion 
Company Year Ended Date Restated Opinion Date 
# of Material Internal 
Control Weaknesses 
Ford Motor 12/31/2005 11/14/2006 1 
General Electric 12/31/2004 5/5/2005 1 
General Electric 12/31/2005 1/19/2007 1 
Monsanto 8/31/2010 11/14/2011 1 
 
Table 3 summarizes the accounting restatements of the sample firms since 2002. As shown in Panel A of 
Table 3, about two-thirds of the sample firms had no accounting restatements. There are 23 firms reporting one 
accounting restatements and eight firms with two accounting restatements. Only two firms had three accounting 
restatements since 2002. Panel B shows that the financial industry had the most accounting restatements probably 
due to the complex operating environment of the financial industry. Panel C also shows that 36 of the 45 accounting 
restatements have negative effects on financial statement numbers such as lower earnings and equity. But 
interestingly, the average accounting restatement period is about 1,151 days whereas the average period between the 
beginning of the restatement period and disclosure period is about 1,312 days. This suggests that, on average, 
accounting restatements was reported within four years after the beginning of the accounting error occurrence. This 
average period is a lot shorter than the 10 years of mandatory audit firm rotation considered by PCAOB. Thus, a 10-
year mandatory audit firm rotation may not improve the timeliness of accounting restatement disclosure. Panel C of 
Table 3 also shows that 39 of the 45 accounting restatements were reported by the same auditor during the 
restatement period. This finding is consistent with the results reported by Whalen and Cheffers (2012) that most 
accounting restatements are not reported by new auditors and mandatory audit firm rotation may not be needed in 
order to have “fresh eyes” discovering previous accounting errors. 
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Table 3:  Accounting Restatements among Sample Firms 
Panel A:  Sample Distribution by Number of 45 Accounting Restatements 
# of Restatement Years # of Firms 
0 67 
1 23 
2 8 
3 2 
Panel B:  Sample Distribution by Industries 
 # of Restatements 
Mining 3 
Manufacturing 7 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 4 
Retail Trade 5 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 14 
Services 4 
Panel C:  Summary Statistics of the 45 Accounting Restatements 
Number of restatements with negative effects on financial statements 36 
Number of restatements with positive effects on financial statements 9 
Average number of calendar days between the beginning and end of 
the restatement dates 
1,151 days 
Average number of calendar days between the beginning of the 
restatement period and disclosure date 
1,312 days 
Maximum negative cumulative restatement to net income -$5.193 billion 
Maximum negative cumulative restatement to equity -$1.352 billion 
Number of restatements with the same auditor in the restatement and 
disclosure periods  
39 
 
Table 4 provides data on client concentration among the Big 4 accounting firms. For each of the 100 
sample firms, we compute a ratio of total audit fees of each firm in relation to the sum of total fees of the local audit 
firm office from all clients in that office. The data might be over or understated since so much work is done by 
multiple offices for major audit clients, with only one office being officially recognized as the lead office on the 
client. The findings in Table 4 suggest that the sample firms provide on average about 20-26% of a local audit firm’s 
total fee revenues. Thus, mandatory audit firm changes could have a significant disruptive impact on a particular 
office in terms of managing its staff in the long term. This effect on audit firm is considered as one of the main 
negative effects of mandatory audit firm rotation (Bowsher et al., 2012). Dangherty et al. (2012) provide survey 
findings that audit firm partners would have to switch to other industry specializations in order to avoid relocation to 
other offices under the current mandatory audit partner requirements. Mandatory audit firm rotation would affect 
even more audit firm employees. Although this would not be a reason to justify not requiring audit firm rotation, this 
is an important factor that PCAOB should consider in reaching it decisions on mandatory audit firm rotation. 
 
Table 4:  Client Concentration in Local Markets 
 # of Firms Meana Mediana 
Big 4 80 0.2278 0.1634 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 24 0.2355 0.2043 
Ernst & Young 24 0.2000 0.1449 
Deloitte & Touche 19 0.2614 0.2037 
KPMG 13 0.2157 0.1552 
a: A ratio of total audit fees of each client in relation to the sum of total fees of the Big4 office from all clients in that office. The top 10% and 
bottom 10% of the sample firms in terms of the ratio are excluded to avoid outlier problems. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This study provides some empirical findings regarding PCAOB’s proposal on mandatory audit firm 
rotation among large firms. We find that large firms, in general, have few material internal control weaknesses and 
accounting restatements. In addition, accounting restatements are often reported within four years after the 
beginning of accounting errors and are reported by the same auditor during the restatement period. We also find that 
large firms represent significant portion of some local audit firms’ revenues. Thus, mandatory audit firm rotation 
could force many auditors to relocate to other offices or switch to other industry specialization. These findings cast 
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doubts on the benefit of mandatory audit firm rotation and suggest concerns on the potential costs to the operation of 
audit firms. Future studies should further investigate other costs and benefits expressed by PCAOB in its 2011 
concept release to provide more empirical data toward this debate. 
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